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T start with a. well-known quotation from Wittgensteb-. "A picture held us 
captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language 
seemed to repeat it to us inexorably." This little fable about the treachery of 
representation puts the captivity in a particular picture, in the past, and outside 
the reflective consciousness of the narrator. This is to say, it is a trap. It is also 
something of a disciplinary in-joke and update, scripted for an audience that reads 
"Wittgenstein" as a synonym for posthermeneutics and that is wise to the ways of 
Cretans who say that all Cretans are liars. I t  was Wittgenstein whc made the 
argument that beyond, beneath, behind the pictures there are more pictures: 
pictures and stories all the way down. The claim was not, that reality is nothing 
but. words and word-practice, only that the experience of a reality unmeciiated by 
the codes that define human societies cannot be considered .any kind of experience, 
not even the experience of nothingness or of nonsense, much less of the gap 
between the real and our knowledge of it. Phenomena that are not presented in 
our languages are not susceptible to our sense-making practices. These practices -- 
irreducibly perspectival and also public events, or, language games -- are 
experience, by another, more analytic name. And, at once closing the language 
loop and opening onto grammatology, the Investigations carry us back to the root 
of the word phenomenon: from the Greek "phanein," to show. Phenomena that 
are not constructed in representation are not eve2 phenomena: by definition, 
"observable fact[s] or event[s I.. .susceptible to.. .description and explanation. " 
Derrida's famous pronouncement, "il n'ya pas de hors-texte," makes the 
point more econo&iczlly. What Wittgenstein gains through the excess of his 
anecdote is a wickedly reflexive twist. "A picture held us captive." One can see 
that the sentence is itself a picture, an image of knowledge production. It is also, 
as it happens, a picture of that kind of knowledge we call mimesis, which casts 
mind as the mirror-image, the picture, of nature. The technical name for this sort 
of piggyback or exponential metaphor is catachresis. Once launched, it unravels 
reference and multiplies intertextuality until nothing but language is left and of 
language, nothing but swerves and substitutes. In its form, the sentence embeds 
an ineluctable narrative of captivation. Like all anecdotes, it is a iittle story 
stsinding in for a bigger one. 
The long version might take the following form. In order to recognize the 
picture you inhabit -- to see it as a picture and yourself as its captive -- you must 
have entered another picture and become captive again: which is to say, blind to 
its constructedness and horizons and illiterate in the languages of other pictures, 
including the one whose frame you now perceive. The recognition is not, therefore, 
the reflexive thing it imagines itself to be: namely, a knowledge of the conditions 
of one's own picture. I t  is instead (and this is a best-case scenario) a sort. of 
boundary perception of some other picture: the inferentially generated awareness 
of a place one cannot enter. Nor does this awareness have available to it a 
language that could name it or even sensualize it without in the same stroke 
dissolving it into the codes that make up the new picture. 
I t  would seem that knowledge of any particular world (which is also agency 
within it, beginning with the act of making sense), occurs only so long as the 
bounding outline and internal grammars of that world remain invisible. Once you 
discern them you know that you are no longer in that world and that your critical 
understanding of it is factitious. Or, knowledge of a world, restricted to its citizens, 
can never produce a consciousness of itself and its conditions that is anything but 
another kind of language game belonging tu the set of games composing that 
world. 
If these are the paradoxes attending the purslit of reflexive knowledge, without 
which empirical knowledge cannot achieve scientific certainty about itself and its 
object-relations (and therefore its objects), then the possibiiity of underived 
knowledge -- knowledge of otherwise worded and pictured worlds, or of realities 
that are not transcendental in any metaphysical sense but that are also not 
always already "for us" -- is literally out of the question. To posit a possible 
awareness just of the existence of other worlds is to propose something like an 
epiphenomenal byproduct of a limit-case perception of one's own world. But again, 
the linguistic argument could readily deconstruct that Kantian (and also aesthetic) 
postulate. 
This paper is about what happens to critique, defined as a hermeneutic 
practice descending from Kant and Hegel (one could also say, Enlightenment and 
Romanticism) when the sort of thinking represented by Wittgenstein's allegory 
becomes axiomatic for scholarship in the humanities, the social sciences, and even 
the physical sciences. The names, Kant and Hegel, mark the moment in our 
intellectual histories when the primacy of metaphysics and ontology is displaced by 
epistemology and its immanent critique: or, Hegel doing to Kant what Kant did to 
everyone else. [FN:namely, calling the question in a critical and empirically 
situated way on the self-determination, transparency, or givenness of the 
foundational terms for that particular discipline of knowing, that science; 
establishing the conditions of possibility of the experience on which that critical 
exercise operates.] In Kant and Hegel, first philosophy's privileged and inscrutable 
questions of being and its transcendental conditions are referred to the study of 
experience and consciousness, and of the worldly conditions of those events. Both 
experience and consciousness are conceived as active and constitutive processes, or 
what we would call today practices of knowing. In this very important respect, 
Wittgenstein is heir to the Kant-Hegel legacy. 
1 1 C  -- , .& At the same time, and this is where Wittgenstein parts company, both 
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critical philosophies struggle a t  some logical cost to maintain the objective, 
,T , domamatic, or unconstructed element in knowing and to make i t  internal to the 
process, not a feature of the object. In Kant, that role is played by the regulative 
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categories that deliver intuition in the form of experience and by the "in itself" 
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t. . presupposed by those categories. In Hegel, this underived otherness resides in the 
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arche and telos of his system (plenitude and totality), and in that initial scission 
which entails the movement from one to the other, the movement of 
externalization and reappropriation that is history. Something of this primordial 
otherness spills over into the nonidentity term within each dialectical moment. I 
refer to the fact that for Hegel, what determines any positive existent, any form, 
is the self-differing or negation within it. This reflects the original antinomy of an 
infinite Geist that realizes itself through its ceaseless overcoming of the finite 
conditions it posits. 
These openings to otherness, positioned by both philosophies a t  the logical 
and genetic core of things and our experience of them, remain outside of language. 
In Kant, this is for structural, quasi-spatial reasons (metaphysical reasons) and in 
Hegel, for phenomenological and temporal reasons: reasons of history. This 
contradictory belonging-together-in-opposition of identity and difference, intuitions 
and concepts, representation and the sublime, culture and nature, history and 
something else, is claimed as the inner structure of experience, which is claimed as 
the reality of "what is," for all practical purposes. Philosophy's mission, 
henceforth, is to advance the understanding of this paradox which generates the 
form and content of the domains of the knowable. (Maybe a t  this point in the 
narrative, we should call say "theory" rather than "philosophy" out of respect for 
the troubled and topically central reflexivity of the enterprise.) ~he 'mark  of the 
enlightened reason is a consciousness that reflects on the intractable paradoxes of 
knowing even as it knows itself and those very reflections caught up in those 
paradoxes. The freedom and the torment of this awareness are directly 
proportional. 
By contrast, agony and aporia have no place in the Wittgensteinian universe. 
There, any claim which pertains to the constitutive other or outside to experience 
is incoherent. Such claims describe an artifact of our grammars: a metaphysical 
origin. And, as against Hegel's postulate of the identity of identity and Merence, 
the linguistic argument holds that any difference one can articulate within a code 
has already been assimilated to it. If the difference is in the identity, then it has 
lost the sahent, the externality, that made it a difference. 
Both critical projects, Kant's and Hegel's, posit an unknov~able element that 
founds the very materials, methods, and rn~tives of -knowing. Rather than kick it 
upstairs, both try to factor this puzzle, this horizonal effect, in'h their practical, 
critical labors. Both, along with the Marxiar? and Freudian critiques that derive 
from them, are logocentric in form but heterological in their content, and they 
stand behind many of the premises that drove our decade's suspicion 
hermeneutics. 
The new historicisms, to the extent that they incorporated the Marxian or 
Freudian paradigms, or insofar as they retained some euuivalent to nature or the 
unconscious, can be conceived as the last of the confidently hermeneutic 
engagements with the literatures of other worlds -- in this case, past worlds. This 
is, possibl3;, the last critical practice to figure the relation between the k x t  and its 
reading as objectively determined, the reading solicited by the structures and 
provenance of the object itself. The new historicisms that fit this description, can 
be taken to represent the constructively skeptical phase of the Kant-Hegel project: 
inquiry into the logical and/or dialectical contradictions that generate the seeming 
immediacy of experience. The goal of analysis is to reread the object in such a 
way as to trace its achieved cultural identity to its historically conflictual 
conditions. The picture of a finished or final world is replaced by a narrative of 
that world's coming into being and of its coming to assume the look of a picture. 
I use that characterization only as a reasonably solid platform from which to 
launch some thoughts about the opportunities for critical work today, now that the 
field of cultural studies has grown so crowded and complex and the new histories 
neither so new as they once were, nor, in a way, so historical. [FN: A question of 
resistance to the symbolic and transformative praxis that constitutes subjects and 
objects. The chiasmic thinking so marked in cultural and historicist studies -- e.g., 
the subject in historylthe history in the subject -- indicates a reciprocity, balance, 
and symmetry that would seem to dissolve the tension which is integral to a 
dialectically materialist and dynamic understanding of history.] This paper is not 
about the life and death of academic movements. It is a practical effort to review 
the options such as they are for persons who share the kind and degree of 
awareness embodied in the Wittgenstein parable, and whose stake in reading -- 
whose intellectual, political, and libidinal attachment -- has been and remains in 
some sort materialist. My inquiry will not hold much interest for those who 
consider themselves pragmatists, relativists, or Rortian hermeneuts. Nor will 
those who equate facts with information and information with knowledge (as is 
sometimes the case in textual studies, literary history, and canon revision) be alive 
to the themes I will be considering. 
That phrase, "in some sort materialist," means in one way or another: 1) 
committed to the picture of texts and readings as products of and participants in 
the forces and relations that bring about the ceaseless reproduction of physical and 
social life. (Before proceeding, let me say that these features do not add up to an 
all-purpose or normative definition of materialism. I merely spell out the 
meanings of the word as I use it in this paper.) Makrialist, by this working 
definition, also entails: 2) a critical practice that repositions the text in any of the 
force fields that concretely defined it a t  any given moment in the past, and (and 
this is crucial), in the present, one field that a materialist critique cannot afford to 
ignore. That caveat harks back to the Kantian theme I mentioned. Even as you 
accept the explanatory status of certain categories and the validity of the moves 
that bind them to the problem at  hand (that is, even as you accept the content 
and form of the materialism specific to your time and place), you also stick to the 
Kantian program of trying to establish the conditions of those categories and 
procedures. This is the reflexive dimension of the exercise. It is always 
incomplete and deluded and it knows and tries to sign$y that fact. 
In addition (and here is the Hegelian strain: 3) materialist critique 
associates meaning with determinate negation, a prolific incursion on the seeming 
immediacy and presence of the real (as in, for example, reflection, repression, 
truncation, circumscription). The re-production of that meaning in the form of 
knowledge entails a second, more deliberated rupture of the object's self- 
presentation at the point of inquiry. This for some technical reasons having to do 
with the mzchinery of semiotics, but more important, on account of a view of 
textual production as determined by a multitude of factors, many of them drawn 
from domains defined by that culture as incompatible or mutually exclusive. The 
introduction of those domains into the critical field thus assumes the character of 
an assault upon the formal integrity of the work. Moreover, because the otherness 
of those domains is often a function of a determinative relation the text cannot 
acknowledge -- for example, the relation between the economic and the aesthetic -- 
those orders may occupy the discourse as a kind of unconscious, what we call a 
political unconscious. Again, the raising up of this material and these relations 
will challenge the work's self-representation. 
There is a fourth element, a wildcard, in my definition of materialism, and that 
is (for want of a better wordj, heterology: the study of what exists a t  some sort of 
tangent to the identity principles of the culture in question. This is the e l e m e ~ t  
deriving from Kant and Hegel by way of Marx, Freud, and among others, 
Althusser, Lacan, Bataille, Levinas, Deleuze, and Lyotard, all of whom posit a 
dimension beyond representation but somehow implicated in it: what Lyotard calls 
"an immanent sublime." In Marx, for example, it is "the fured framework within 
which the subject forms a substance that it encounters." In Freud, it would be the 
pre-economic, pre-structural workings of repression and also the negativity that  
drives through and beyond the pleasure principle. In Althusser, it is the magic of 
structural causality, the (nonmechanical, nonexpressive) effectivity of the whole in 
its parts: a whole that is "neither an unknowable thing-in-itself, nor...a string of 
events or set of facts ... but]  rather an asymptotic phenomenon, an outer limit, 
which the subject approaches in the anxiety of the moment of truth ..." [FJ,F.of 
Ag.12,13]. For Lacan, it is the gaze "to which I am subjected in an original way" -- 
that is, in such a way as to originate the subject as lack, in the sense of inability 
to grasp its conditions of being or to see itself seeing. (Four Funda.Conc.of Psych). 
When the citing of this dimension is coupled with a discourse or stylistic 
performznce of its ineffability, it is the marker of critique as such. I t  locates the 
point where, historically, critical theory split off from first philosophy, and also 
where aesthetic modernity came into being. By that I mean first the Romantic 
and then the avant-garde project of representing the unpresentable (or, borrowing 
once again from Lyotard, presenting that there is something unrepresentable): 
namely, the medium and the frame of the particular artwork, of the category of 
the aesthetic, and of the subject- and origin effects engendered by both. 
Unlike metaphysics, heterology treats this unspeakable otherness as a special 
feature of the social-historical constructedness of things, not as their 
transcendental ground. Through some peculiar position or embodiment within the 
dominant codes, this otherness resists symbolization absolutely. I t  thus assumes 
an effective or what might be called a virtual materiality: under certain conditions 
or in certain contexts, an irreducibly thing-like character. The materialist reading 
tries, with complete and completely conscious illogic, to display, preserve, and even 
to share in that quality. 
"Material," in this context, means unreadable. I t  means a text or some 
part of a text that is either transparent or opaque and thus not exactly or not 
completely a text. Because of its closure and self-presence -- that is to say, its 
success in realizing those effects -- the material object does not absorb. I t  
fascinates. It is the effect or the reading some poets hope for: not the one that 
exclaims "'Heavens, I recognize the place, I know it!"' but the reading that says, 
"'Hell, I don't recognize the place or the time or the 'I' in this sentence. I don't 
know it."' [Bernstein] The meaning of this object will not take shape as a 
narrative, the form of an intention, no matter how troubled, repressed, or 
dispersed. Instead, meaning here amounts to something like action potentials or 
adhesive surfaces, and because these intensities cannot break free and assume 
some form of equivalence, the object cannot circulate. To that extent, which is far 
from total, it generates no value. The economy to which it relates is not the 
"restricted economy of accumulation but the general economy of meaning as 
unusable flow and unrecompensed loss. One could say that the object releases a 
meaning that has no meaning. I t  is just something else in the world. 
"Material" proposes an event neither reflecting nor yielding to a human 
interest, except of course, the interest in otherness as such once it gets objectified 
through the critical or aesthetic discourses. Heterology would like to avert this 
interest (nothing would make it happier), but it never can. 
Baudrillard has written of the "dream of the status of the object and 
consumption beyond exchange and use, beyond value and equivalence." "Dream" 
is the operative word here, but just as crucial is the fact that dreams are socially 
made and coded and thus both real and shared experience with real consequences. 
This particular dream, which classically comes under the heading of the aesthetic 
(and also, within related discourses, under the rubric of nature), is perhaps 
capitalism's special and in some ways sustaining fantasy. Unlike the commodity, 
which is paradigmatically readable due to the sharpness of its form-content 
contradiction, the object enjoys an effective self-identity which opens no space for 
intervention. Thus, it "never completely gives up its secret," which is, of course, 
that it has none. (Probably: one can never really know.) The object, a word one 
must bracket so as to keep foregrounding its character as a social (in the manner 
of anti-social) Imaginary and as the effect of particular histories of cultural 
production, affords nothing to do. I t  offers no contradictions to resolve, no interior 
to no gaps to outline and then, by way of a metadiscourse, suture -- in 
short, no resistance to reading and therefore no payoff. To this extent, it 
challenges the work model of activity grounding those philosophies of the subject 
that engendered the aesthetic as such -- that is, as a critique of that work model -- 
in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. And, because the object (so-called! does 
not mount its challenge as an oppositioral, libidinal, or even critical project, it 
undermines that aesthetic, its autotelic hedonism, from the other side, exposing its 
.negativity as another value-form. In other words, the an-aesthetic signature of 
tb.e object highlights the complicity between on the one hand art and 
interpretation as forms of value- and subject-production, and on the other, the 
particular model of humanness specified by the capitalist modes of production. 
.Then again, one cannot help noticing that the mysterious self-possession of 
the object and the passivity of its reception are also the effects of the commodity, 
that elementary unit of capitalist production and exchange, when it  is working 
most efficiently, or when it most thoroughly erases its social and its labor content. 
In other words, the object's thwarting of a productive, semiotic consumption can on 
the one hand offer itself as a critique of those processes of abstraction, 
instrumentality, and equivalence that rule the world of exchange. By calling the 
question on that particular system of value, however, and no matter how artlessly, 
the object generates another discourse of value, one that comes to be synonymous 
with ideology itself or its inverting and obscuring of actual social processes. Over 
and above its material dividends, the object produces an illusion of escape from the 
political economy of the sign, im illusion essential to the healthy functioning of 
that economy. 
But then again (what I am tracking by these turns is the dialecticity of this 
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would-be postdialectical osject), the rational, skeptical conquest of such illusions -- 
as outlined in the paragraph above - is the very telos of economic reason. I t  is 
realized when thought is so thoroughly formalized as to be "robbed of that for the 
sake of which men [and women] think." That phrase is Adorno's, as is the 
general approach to these paradoxes of progress. 
From this dialectical tangle, familiar to students of Romanticism, the 
Frankfurt School, and the avant-garde, we may conclude that to read the myth of 
the object -- to expose its founding material and social conditions -- is not to 
exhaust the reality of that myth. It is, rather, to release the myth from the 
unreality of its reified form. Possibly, it is to change its sign from a cultural 
practice that is on balance affmative to one that exerts more critical force. What 
we do next, however, to keep that reality (in philosophical terms, that posit; in a 
Marxist idiom, that second nature) from getting reified all over again, is the 
question that drives heterology. It is a question to ask now, now that through the 
work of the past ten years, the dead are awakened. 
Michael Taussig, a cultural anthropologist, proposes a mode of analysis that 
works its way free of various notions of contradiction in order to capture the 
"decided undecidability that could so clearly, so mistily, be seen in Marx's 
statement regarding the fetish quality of commo&ties" -- the "flip-flop from spirit 
to thing and back again." Throughout his recent collection, The Nervous System, 
Taussig juxtaposes what Paul Ricoeur identified in Freud as on the one hand, a 
suspicion hermeneutics, and on the other, a restorative mimesis. Taussig calls this 
a critical practice that both "demystifies and reenchants." It reenchants because 
it knows that alongside the mystery of why, when, and how--questions of motive, 
manner, and meaning--there remains the stubborn and deeply disquieting question 
of what, aimed at the webs of contingency and mere combination that render the 
disenchanted world, the place of either empirical self-certainty or analytically 
produced evidence, such a twilight zone. Those epistemic boundary paradoxes I 
traced at  the beginning of this essay, having to do with the logical impossibility of 
ever accounting for the conditions of one's knowledge within that knowledge 
paradigm help to explain this phenomenon. A more concrete explanation, the kind 
Taussig favors, would look to the always ironic and punctually terrible history of 
the advanced capitalist societies, many of whose crises foreground the internal 
limits of Enlightenment and its practices of knowing and ordering, its domination 
of nature. 
EN: I refer very schematically frrst to the decisive and ideologically m.arked 
shifts from absolutist to bourgeois regimes in the early 19th century. As we know, 
this emancipation entailed the reification and essentialization (i.e., mystification) 
of class, race, and gender, without which the exploitation of particulzr groups, and 
the self-representation of the bourgeoisie as the universal and col~summate class, 
could not have proceeded. A second flashpoint in that history: the demonization 
of those essentialized Others to the western male bourgeois norm, peaking with 
the military-industrial nation states of the mid-thirties through the sixties, and 
their genocidal and quasi-colonial wars of attrition. 
The special and highly visible compact between on the one hand the 
advanced theoretical, technological, industrial, and social sciences of these eras, 
and on the other, their peculiarly atavistic excesses, led many students of the 
human sciences to search out the mystifying potentials of intellectual practices 
that had seemed in some absolute sense emancipatory. The reflexive turn was 
unavoidable; the critique of analytic reason (regarded as a subset of instrumental 
reason) entailed a more skeptical, more locally, topically, and politically attentive 
appraisal of the techniques and even the objectives of such classically liberatory 
and post- or even anti-Enlightenment exercises as ideology critique, social- 
historical reconstruction, and canonical intervention. What survives as a 
methodological point of departure is the question of immanence: is the method 
immanent to its object when the object is understood to be the actuality of its 
social history up through the present of its interrogation.] 
Heterology, when it is understood as part of a self-undoing and therefore 
self-renewing materialist project, might at this point take its bearings from 
Taussig's observation that "context as explanation is the fixed screen" onto which 
many of our histories from below are projected. It is this screen, Taussig argues, 
"that poses the greatest resistance to change, [and all] the forgotten and 
oppressed voices we cast upon it," he says, do not alter that surface. He cites our 
"profound and self-constituting entanglement" in that screen of interpretation as 
"the great arena where world history ... folds into rules of customary sense." 
Heterology reminds us that once that fold between history and custom disappears, 
once a paradigm of knowing starts feeling'like the form of the real, once the screen 
becomes a transparent medium -- the wall of the cave -- must "work harder 
not to understand," knowing all the while we will never reach that place of 
intelligent indifference [FN: i.e., a sort of cognitive and also recursive parallelism 
to our objects of study; not intersubjectivity, to be sure, and not mimesis; 
something rather on the order of Spinoza's double-aspect model of materialist 
explanation] and that if we did, we would not recognize ourselves. That is because 
we would not be ourselves. 
Heterology, a useful waste product (or, a byproduct) of the capitalist 
economies, is the thought behind Baudrillard's symbolic exchange and Bataille's 
nonproductive expenditure, both of them fantasies (precapitalist, primitivist, 
Maussian) of a state of loss which is not the prelude to possession. These states 
imply picturing without devouring and being devoured, a rejection, this, of the no- 
win language game of supplements (Derrida's semiotic elaboration of the 
commodity and the money forms). They suggest a Deleuzian or Nietzschean 
dream of affirmation without negation; or, production without consumption a t  
either end. They project a place beyond economic reason and by the same token, 
antioedipus. Alongside "investment, desire, passion, seduction ... expression and 
competition -- the hot universe, " they set "ecstasy, obscenity, fascination,. . .hazard, 
chance and vertigo -- the cold universe." 
.- - , - [FN: A more contemporary version of this fantasy takes incorporation as 
i. 
its model of embodiment which is not paid for by the domination of both internal 
and external otherness. In place of recuperative self-alienation, this incorporative 
model proposes combination, machinic assemblage, and transcategorical &ty as 
+." 
its formal principles. One can discern in this most recent, postmodern but still 
Marxist critique of the subject an extension of Adorno's great and tragic campaign 
-* . against the triumphalism of the emancipatory materialisms of the 18th and 19th 
centuries. What is new and radical about the effort to rethink cultural critique by 
reference to a technologically and sociohistorically reinvented nature is its drive 
beyond the state-approved playground of the aesthetic: its work on the 
productivist paradigm itself, something that Adorno in the 1940s through 60s, 
ages of industrial monopoly capitalism, could not begin to accomplish. In place of 
the mastery models of materialization and individuation and their productive 
consumption of nature, these social critics propose a model of embodiment 
"understood as a complex, labile, overtone structure, neither dependent upon nor 
reducible to, an organic substrate or historical object ..." [Zone]] 
The business of cultural materialism when oriented toward that frigid zone 
is neither contextual rewriting nor ideology critique, actions that must, however, 
precede or accompany it. Lacking that, heterology is indistinguishable from 
phenomenology or ontology, pragmatism, pluralism, or any other readout of 
spdntaneous subjectivity. Heterology begins only &r the apparent self-identity 
and givenness of the object has been negated, replaced by a narrative of its 
participation in the historical and social formations and projects of its own time 
and that of the critic. Once, that is, the work's objective character, consisting in 
its functional relations within the social whole or wholes, has been established. 
Since, however, neither the social whole nor, therefore, the objective 
character of the discourse can ever be definitively established (particularly since it 
involves the everchanging variable of the critic's position), one must ask what it is 
that curtails this exercise and initiates heterology. (And, a question I consider 
below: what happens to the oppositional and cognitive force of sociohistorical 
reinscription if heterology is refused.) In large part, the answer to the question of 
what prompts a heterological phase will turn on the current conditions of 
knowledge production for the field and object a t  issue, conditions in one way of 
another organized by the economic and social whole. One wonders, however, 
whether the two actions, critique of textual production and heterology, might enjoy 
a more integral relation. I want to venture an imagination of the way those two 
critical actions, both of them materialist, but one in an anthro- or sociopocentric 
way, the other in a way that verges on metaphysics, might summon each other. 
First, though, I have to say why I belabor a point that must remain 
speculative (and in passing, explain what I meant when I said that the new 
historicisms are somehow not as historical as they once were.) It seems to me that 
a present-day materialism wanting to hold onto the tension between on the one 
hand the Wittgensteinian or constructivist picture, and on the other, the 
hermeneutic, heterological, critically reflected strain, will have a hard time of it. 
This for reasons that  concern the recent history of literary studies in our country 
and on account of larger, more determinant tendencies in the culture. In the 
academy, there is the fact of the long awaited and much deserved prestige of the 
soziohistorical rewriting of literature and other cultural icons. By that I mean the 
work of restoring the artifacts that make up our cultural canons to their condition 
as social practice, conceived as irreducibly historical and as both driven and 
mediated by specific and conflicting interests. These interests are shown to be 
underwritten by more compelling, pervasive, and obscure, but no less constructed 
pressures. The work of disclosing these dynamic patterns has come to be 
synonymous with critique as such and also with a liberationist as opposed to a 
liberal set of values. I t  is grouped with the resistance literatures it often studies, 
and with the anti-hegemonic strains it discerns within many of the high cultural 
discourses and many more of the popular ones. 
Ranked on the other side, the reactionary side, are resources associated with 
both the formalist movement, prominent here in the 1940's and 507s, and the 
historical scholarship that preceded it, the paradigm of literary study before the 
war. Both were rejected for their objectivism, or for their way of masking their 
own political investments as well as the politics (cultural and topical) embedded in 
the "data," the aesthetic or the historical record which they manipulated. Also on 
that losing side: the ontological and linguistic preoccupations of "t.heory," or of the 
Continental traditions revived in this country in the 1960's. What was rejected 
there was the general argument that being and language, and also their aporetic 
or antinomial relation to each other, have an objective and fmed reality 
independent of cultural practice. The essentialist and universalizing form of the 
proposition -- again, its false objectivity -- marked it as an idealism. 
I offer this overview so as to highlight the institutional problems faced by a 
materialism that has not withdrawn its investment in objectivity: or, to use a less 
burdened and binary word, Adorno's word, "nonidentity." I t  conceives this order 
of things as a thoroughly mediated phenomenon that may a t  certain points exceed 
the causalities that brought it into being. Nor does a materialism of this kind 
repudiate theory -- borrowing again from Adorno, a striving by the concept to 
transcend the concept. Or (and this is Jonathan Culler's recent definition of 
theory), "a critique of the natural" through "investigation of the mode of study in 
which you have some experience." When it sees that critique of the natural has 
become the natural, it takes that as its problem, along with the matter of fmding 
a mode of study that is not wholly -- or rather, not evenly -- enmeshed in that 
problem. The element of theory is, among other things, a line of defense against 
the tendency of stories, however dialogic or dialectical, to become facts, and of 
facts, however constructed and contingent, to become fetishes. Theory interferes 
with the self-witnessing authenticity of narrative and factual presentment (of 
everything, one might hazard, but poetic presentment, and that too, eventually). 
I t  counters, if only by foregrounding, the tendency of all knowledge practices, 
including itself, to remake the other into a version of the self; and of all such 
versions to recapitulate the self-aggrandizing but also ultimately self-defeating 
philosophy of the subject, as built up by the four great critiques of the modem 
period, that of Kant, Hegel, Marx, and Freud. A materialist critique maintains 
these commitments because it is alive to the fact that knowledge, no matter how 
antinomial, has no defenses against the form of the system, and that the system, 
"the form of presenting a totality to which nothing is extraneous, absolutizes the 
thought against each of its contents and evaporates the content in thoughts. I t  
proceeds idealistically before advancing any ar,auments for idealism." [Adorno, 
Neg-Dials] 
As little as five years ago, it seemed that a postproductivist but still Marxist 
materialism could satisfy these dual commitments. I t  could puncture the 
constructivist paradigm by positing some version of both nonidentity and the 
whole -- nature and history -- the two poles of a dialectical objectivism. At the 
same time, it could make a problem of the status of labor, production, and the 
economic, the textbook mediations between those poles. (By status, I pinpoint the 
conception of these practices as singular or unified functions within a systematic 
account of social practice.) While it challenged the primacy of those moments and 
elements, along with the "ontological centrality of the working class," the notion of 
prehistory, and the postulate of antagonism between the human and the natural, 
Marxism's epistemological field was still ordered by the figure of contradiction. 
The content of objectivity might have been abandoned but the differential 
structure which produced it as a scientific form remained. The mechanism of 
dialectics in history and its workings in the relation between critique and its object 
and critique and the dominant subject forms of its own moment, commanded belief 
in a way that seems no longer the case. By contrast, the work that has been done 
on the politics of identity as opposed to class -- work in gender, race, and 
postcoloniality -- has redrawn our pictures of the relation between material 
conditions and labor on the one hand, and consciousness, ideology, and agency on 
the other, with the general effect of making such two-handed formulations and 
even the more dynamic and recursive versions thereof obsolete. The very notion of 
structures, relations, and-forces which exist in some sort of generative and 
scientifically explanatory tension with one another is no longer standard even for 
Marxist analysis. Contamination, hybridity, subalternity: these are not the 
hscldsomely structured and dynamic differences-in-identity that support the 
Freudian and Marxian hermeneutics. In fact, these shape-shifting and semi- 
permeable formations are more like a usurpation of that function, just as 
transgression tends to squeeze out the classical forms of negation and opposition. 
The more general and also technical obstacles to a materialism that is 
curious to entertain hyper- or countertextual worlds -- worlds that are, for 
different reasons, incommensurable with the given codes -- come into play at the 
point of reception, where our critical studies enter the larger iultural marketplace. 
Here they are subjected to the routine defensive mechanisms of late capital, where 
cultural recognition, approving or critical, does the work of absorption. (This is not 
to say that the processing begins a t  this point; the setting of goals and the 
availability of methods are also determined.) This is what Adorno meant, or 
anticipated, by his phrase, "the form of the system" in the passage -quoted above. 
The attacks on the academy's revisionist pictures turn out to be yet another way 
to reproduce and circulate them, a way in short to commodify and thus neutralize 
opposition. Attack a t  this level proceeds mechanicdy and therefore inexorably. 
As many have noted, the once disturbing exposures of the historically 
determined and (more disturbing) overdetermined particulars that generate the 
reality of cultural appearances a t  given moments have lost their edge. More 
precisely, they have lost their immanence, the quality that distinguishes critique 
from criticism, or historical from criteriological analysis. Through no fault of their 
own, our stories of cultural production have become episodes in capitalism's 
masterplot: the transformation of matter into value, suffering into meaning, 
givenness into necessity: nature into culture. I t  is as if the gap in the phrase, 
"historical materialism" (at best a negotiated coupling) has closed over. A 
redemptive logic has come to embrace the hitially estranging, counterintuitive, 
and for those reasons, materially realizing rewritings of the closures that made up 
our cmons, and those of us who do this work are the hapless agents of that 
redemption. Naturally, the subject we celebrate is no longer the autonomous 
individual nor is i t  the autotelic text. Instead, we have groups, genders, and races 
(the elements of an identity politics) as well as disciplines, discourses, and 
practices of consumption (a more impersonal but. no less coherent and creative set 
of agencies). The new subject's labors of self-making are constrained, opposed, and 
even thwarted, but the heroic story of bourgeois reproduction remains. That story 
is objectified in our critical performances, through which history's contingencies are 
woven into a pattern' of conflicting, unself-conscious, but individually coherent 
intentions. At the same time, the effrontery of these patterns (often a function of 
the dissonance which organizes them) establishes the reader who reveals them as 
a bold and original producer, clearing a space in a crowded market. One is 
reminded of the competitive subject of capital, who takes r e d  risks that cannot 
help but ensure the stability of the system they appear to threaten. In addition, 
in waging these warfares against the inertias that govern our present and our uses 
of the past, we realize ourselves as virtuous citizens of an enlightened society, 
acting out that great theme from the repertoire of bourgeois liberalism: free 
speech, internal opposition, consensus by way of dissensus. 
There is in other words a certain truth to the perception of a tyranny of the 
politically correct. Institutional and therefore coercive approval -- correctness -- is 
what happens to Merence and more emphatically, dissidence, in a society like 
ours. The particular founding impulses of the critical action are erased, its 
techniques abstracted, standardized, and taught, its productivity harnessed and 
enhanced, and the affront made over into a normative position. 
I want to be very explicit about the fact that a twn toward heterology is 
not an attempt to revive either a metaphysically referenced picture or an 
infrastructurally reflective one, nor is it a return to the predialectical 
materialisms. I t  is only to try to embody in a way that produces some sort of 
distance effect qualities that do not add up to the human as currently constituted, 
without a t  the same time dissolving those qualities into a mystique of otherness, 
another orientalism. It is to do this, acknowledging in both the form and 
substance of one's practice the futility of the thing but the value of the effort. 
Ideally, one performs this impossible practice uithout romanticizing it. You try 
not to imagine that the wish or capacity to sustain these contradictions springs 
you from the trap of normal science, or, returning to W-ittgenstein's model, 
releases you from your picture. 
Still: a heterology that arises from and remains in a cranky and fitful way 
within a sociohistorical practice may well be a difYerent kind of normal science, a 
different way of occupying the picture. Very few of our knowledge models try to 
justify their aims and methods by reference to external criteria, but most want to 
project some sort of logical consistency, or validity within their own terms. 
Heterology, by contrast, declares itself internally inconsistent without going on to 
devise a metalogic to rationalize its practice. The justification occurs concretely, 
performatively, within each exercise and cannot be generalized from one to the 
next. If it takes the form of a concept, its relation to the practice is figured as a 
relation, constructed for the purposes of the exercise. Nonetheless, a more 
regulative and objective notion of validity in interpretation survives in the very 
postulate of an outside or other to representation, albeit a historically constructed 
and changing outside. [FN: Althusser's discussion of the necessity for symptomatic 
reading may illuminate this paradox. He explains the existence of certain lapses 
and inconsistencies, a certain hollowness within particular discourses of knowledge 
as signs of a concept unable to be produced within the discourse that it founds and, 
in its present-absent or nonnormative way, occupies. 29,30:Lenin and Philosophy.] 
I t  seems possible that heterology, just by materializing the longing for effects that 
are empirically unavailable may conjure the bounding line of those interests and 
practices that make up the writer's human nature, a t  this time, in this place. To 
take an interest in these effects is also to maintain a critical and a utopian 
attitude toward the conditions of contemporary life: I t  is to hold faith with some 
older ideas, Enlightenment and Romantic ideas, about knowledge as social 
transformation that does not short-circuit radical transfiguration. Let me add 
that the technical, conceptual, and political problems facing a heterological critique 
are both legion and insurmountable. Still, for persons possessed of certain values, 
the staging of these problems seems a good thing -- a t  certain times, the best thing 
-- to do. 
I return to the question of how the two strains of the materialism I have 
been constructing might be related. Sociohistorical rewriting of the work will, if it 
is effective, do violence to the self-understanding and professed values of the work. 
This will persist until such time as the community's concept of textual and cultural 
nature expands to absorb the antithetical element. (In a formalist idiom, until 
such time as the work manages to intentionalize the orders of difference visited 
upon it.) Up to that point, however, critical reconstruction of the work in its social 
habitats will take apart its given integrity. This for many reasons, some of which 
I mentioned in reference to the relation between a critical negativity and the 
political unconscious of the text in question. If we narrow the field to texts that 
descend to us under the sign of literature or the aesthetic or even just "culture," 
high or low, then the violence of a materialist reading is explained by the fact that 
whatever those discourses do or did in the way of affirming or denying their 
material conditions of being, whatever their idealizing intentions or effects, their 
re-production as literature or art, or %heir social ontology as symbols of the cultural 
whole in one way or another effaces the material facts of their life. This may not 
be the case for cultural production in the present, but it does seem to apply to 
works produced from the Enlightenment through the high modern period. And it 
is also true for works that have been or currently are reproduced by methods 
invented during that span. This has to do with distinctions between the aesthetic 
and the practical (broken down, the cognitive, ethical, and juridical), a diacritics 
hammered out in the late 18th century. The breach of that decorum must involve 
a rupture a t  the level of self-representation. 
At the same time, the self-representations involved in the critical act are 
also put at risk. One violence breeds another. In mounting an antithetibal but 
immanent critique of the identity principles of the past, our words enter into an 
altered relation to present day discourses of donlinance, inevitably engaged during 
the process of writing. The work of articulating the blindness-insight ratios linking 
the discourse to its moment may outline the traces of a similarly implicated 
relation between our own technologies of knowing and the identity principles of 
our time and place. This chain reaction may be a function of the highly contained 
field in which the demystifying exercise takes place. And it may happen only in 
cases where the study-text emerged from the conditions, however uneven, of 
capitalist production and ideology, where the aesthetic is granted its own self- 
regulating domain. The text's discovered bondage to the conditions of its time and 
place, juxtaposed against our own critical autonomy may put that freedom of ours 
in question. (Remember: critique is c~assically fi,wed as the most liberated and 
citizen-defming action available to members of enlightened, democratic societies.) 
Or, the ideological distancing, whereby we come to perceive the 
constructedness of our forms of knowing, may have to do with more technical 
matters. I am thinking of the relative speed and intimacy that characterize the 
circulation of academic discourse today, or within what has been called the 
information society. In very short order, we see our language cited, framed, used, 
abused, and so forth. The reproduction of our arguments happens so fast and so 
close at hand that its reality as reproduction rather than response or commentary- 
emerges. The individual producer-critic is positioned to see how little she controls 
the meanings she writes. She sees how public and also unpredictable an event her 
argument is; or, how her argument includes its effects, its readings and 
misreadings. She sees what is typically concealed by capitalist relations: the social 
production of meaning. (This is a good thing.) 
There may also be something like a dialectical logic that helps explain the 
punctual availability of heterology as a materialist operation. In rewriting the 
myths of the past, we cast them in the new body of present-day enlightenment 
discourse. By the same token, thus do we mingle our own distinctive error, our 
myths, with an alien body, that of the texts upon which we enact our 
enlightenments. One possible result of this miscegenation is a sensuous excess at  
the level of textuality, an order, or rather a disorder, that highlights the 
dissonance within our own practices of knowing: something like the ideological 
distantiation Althusser attributes exclusively to art. I associate these effects with 
the violent juxtaposition of two Merent social formations in the confined space of 
a textual exercise, a reading, performed upon any sort of discourse. The aesthetic 
then becomes a name for the results of this clash, not for the work or category 
that enables it. I call these results excess because while they will not submit to 
toAda t ion  or translation, they owe their occurrence to those actions, to which 
they are related as a by-product and horizon. 
This excess exerts an oppositional force, but its style of resistance is peculiar. 
Dispersed, disorderly, noncumulative, it prevents the formation of an equal and 
opposite subject- or identity form. The style of attack is more like terrorism than 
orchestrated warfare. Like Kant's sublime, these uncoordinated points of 
reference bring us up against the inadequacy of our cognitive codes and in so 
doing, they make us feel the presence of those codes. They crystallize the 
medusan tangle of knowledge and falsehood, freedom and confinement, that 
structures our subjectivity but whose contents must remain a blank to us. Then 
we know that we cannot know the condition of our knowledge, only, and this is a 
best-case scenario, its aporetic form. 
It would seem that the obvious thing to do with these effects which resist 
the hermeneutic that released them is to conceive them as a site of encounter with 
a c&tural repressed. What then? The effort to search out whatever it is that we 
cannot know precisely because that particular ignorance is the condition of our 
knovring is, naturally, pointless. Only if the search proceeds in some extravagant 
and unseemly way, a way that falls outside our logical practices, can it perhaps 
trick us into "other" awareness. Consider the optical illusion (a deep truth, as it 
turns out) used by Freud to instance the uncanny. The mirrored door suddenly 
swings open, giving the good doctor a reflection of himself not absorbing his gaze 
and therefore not abridging the self-alienation of personhood in the way one's 
mirror image always does. All at  once, the objective conditions of his usual gaze, 
his subjectivity, materialize. For a moment, he is othered, but with a sense of 
return to an identity that preceded the coherence of his ego-self. [Or: consider 
what it means for a subject, conceived as nothing but the effects of a repression, to 
conduct an inquiry into that process. The transferential method -- a restorative 
mimesis -- is Freud's solution to this logical dilemma.] 
To reject these visions of excess as a reactionary fantasy of transcendental 
or reflexive origins is also to betray what should be elementary for materialist 
critique: namely, that it is only materialist so long as it remains historical, and 
that means willing to reinvent its form and its content as its own conditions of 
production change. Lacking that, it is idealism by another name. To persist in a 
certain kind of cultural critique once i t  has become second-nature within the age's 
practices of knowing is to comply with the absorptive tendencies of capital. Or, 
since there can be no such thing as a uniformly, universally, or ultimately effective 
noncompliance, one should say that it is to stop producing the wish to interfere 
with the machinery that profitably incorporates difference into the mainstream. 
More than thrty years ago, Roland Barthes pondered the unbridgeable gap 
between what he called "speaking the object" and penetrating it: the latter. an act 
of rendering it, in his words, "permeable to history," a move Barthes rejects. He 
refers to that, the historicizing operation, as mythology and ideologism, while he 
terms the other labor poetry: "the search for the inalienable meaning of things." 
The binary set-up is dated and even a t  the time, it had to be disingenuous, but 
the conclusion Barthes draws from this sterile opposition would not be rejected 
today: namely, that the idea of a critical discourse bound as a subject to an object- 
text is bankrupt. In its place, Barthes proposes an implosion of the art versus 
knowledge, speaking versus penetrating binary. The writing he imagines would 
enact a subject-predicate relation in the world, a practical as opposed to a power 
relation, reminiscent of Kenneth Burke's proposal of a hyphenated rather than 
hierarchical relation. This is a view in keeping with the aesthetic turn, so called, 
taken by some critical work today. That phrase describes a knowledge discourse 
imitative of collage or montage in its efforts to incorporate but not absorb the 
material object or effect, nor to erase its categorial difference from the host 
discourse. What is rejected is the logocentrism (and circularity) of the ar-went- 
and-example approach. 
And yet, the big, old questions remain. How does the subject-predicate 
relation, the sentence that is writing, aesthetic or critical, relate to the more 
dominant or coercive sentences inscribed in the literatures we study? Can it relate 
to a world of sentences outside our culture, or at its breeding center, interstices, or 
peripheries? To call this new sentence postmodernism (and it certainly conforms to 
the profile), is to read it as a declaration that cultural modernity in the sense of a 
simultaneously oppositional relation to the state and a reflexive relation to  its own 
medium has run its course. What kind of writing can develop under these 
constraints that will still satisfy the conditions of a materialist critique as I have 
defrned it? 
To answer that question and to do it without inviting the absorptions I have 
been tracking, I will first make some general observations based on the preceding 
analysis of the problem. Then I will give some examples of work that embraces 
rather than denies the contradictions that arise for a critique that is both 
historically and reflexively materialist. 
First, a general reorientation. We could make a shift from a practice of 
knowing conceived along the lines of individual intellectual production to a critical 
writing that in one way or another disclaims that control. I do not mean, although 
I also-do not exclude collaborative writing, nor am I thinking primarily of coteries 
or schools. The gesture the writing makes is not toward recognized others, as in 
partners, opponents, or potential converts. Instead, it finds ways to bring out 
what is in fact the case -- that is, the social production of meaning -- and to make 
that fact work not to annihilate difference but to multiply it. The trick is to 
understand the social not as a monolithic, coherent, or even knowable body, nor as 
a constituency waiting to be fashioned. Rather, the social could serve as a name 
for the unforeseeable otherness that comes to occupy our writing as it makes its 
way in a time-frame that is always more uneven than it seems, including slices of 
the future not just the past. "Making its way" can mean an open-ended set of 
encounters between the many agencies and intentions that our critical writing 
embodies and the many that re-embody it. I t  can mean the mercy of misreading, 
a providence it is easy to concede when we are the ones misreading, and doing it 
upon .what would otherwise be the abstract and unreal literatures of the past. It 
is a harder thing to apply the logic not just to one's own critical work but to 
present-day reception, where there are no historical meren t ids  to sanctify the 
violence. I t  seems worth doing because from the perspective of the individual 
knowledge producer it must be, following Wittgenstein, pictures and stories all the 
way down. Some people will find that fact depressing because they will 
understand that i t  is always "our" stories and pictures, no matter how wide we 
cast the content net. From the standpoint of a transindividual discourse 
production, however -- neither the standpoint of the whole nor of the part, but 
rather of the series -- "a surplus of the Real over every symbolization that 
functions as an object-cause" may materialize. This standpoint can never be 
seized. (One could also say, the series cannot be totalized.) That is why Hegel 
called the series a "bad infinity." For me, that may be its goodness: the virtue of 
a standpoint that can only be recognized after the fact or extrapolated from 
textual encounters. I t  is always all before us or behind. I t  resembles what Homi 
Bhabha has called "a space of 'translation'," where we may construct "a political 
object that is new, neither the one nor the Other ... : (He means, by that phrase, 
neither the Master nor the Slave.) As Barthes said, "'I' am always powerless to 
render the wholeness of the object." But part of that may have to do with the 
way that the very establishment of a k n o A g ,  rendering, "I" as against a world of 
unconsecrated otherness recapitulates the subject-object divide which "knowing" 
presumably wants to close. Perhaps the felt gap between poetry and science, 
speaking the object and penetrating it, would narrow if the writerly "I" could set 
aside the closures of' self-definition. I t  could, for example, re-invent its concept 
each time it puts its identity into practice. Instead of purposes and projects, this 
sort of knowing would have ways of proceeding, different ways and means for each 
occasion. 
Perhaps the one fairly restricted thing that more than any other makes 
critique so pliable to the regimes of the marketplace is its management of its 
concepts. The relation between the idea, methods, and materials of any particular 
critique is always problematic, this for reasons no more profound than the fact 
that the combinations making up the histories we study are always in flux, that 
the decision as to where a story begins and ends is just that, a decision, and that 
the act of deciding the outlines of the story is also an episode in that story, one 
that can never fully account for itself there. But these particulars get buried as 
the work takes its place in an institutional economy. If a writing could keep its 
concept, which is for writing what self-consciousness is for persons, sealed in its 
practice, it might perform the symbolic act of instancing a subjectivity that is not 
given in advance and that is more permeable to its textual and social 
environments than is customary in our critical language games. The embodiment 
of these possibilities may be the most powerful thing critique can accomplish 
today. I t  may clear a space in which the otherness of our language and objects 
can materialize and alongside it, not above, some understanding of those 
mysteries. 
No kind of writing escapes the loop of recuperative expenditure. But it can 
circulate in odd and disturbing ways that make it harder to reproduce than the 
other commodities. I t  can define orbits that are larger and less predictable than 
those laid out by capital. As Paul Mann has argued in his book The Theoq-Death 
of the Avant-Garde, every cultural gesture, no matter how anarchic, ascetic, or 
densely coded, becomes a value-form: the form of equivalence between unlike 
things and qualities. In intellectual currency, this equivalence takes the form of 
the concept. We cannot prevent the concept from emerging alongside the practice 
nor should we try, because the concept is also, for dialectical reasons, deliverance 
from the spurious transparencies projected by practice. The wish that drives 
heterology, however, is to control the possession and use of this value-form. 
Again, there is nothing like a foolproof or final way to do this. But by making a 
problem of the relation between theory and practice, a writer can restrict the 
possession of her language to those who will do the work of reinventing it in the 
special circumstances that define their own work. The original wilL then relate to 
its reinvention as a version, losing its privileged status as first and definitive. In 
the play of these determinate but interactively unstable languages, the object of 
heterology may take shape. What to do with i t  is another question, but just to ask 
it is already to have breached (a little) the economy of white writing. 
The impulse is to bring even this thought of a conceptually problematic 
practice under a concept. For example, de Certeau's distinction between strategy 
and tactics would seem to explain the disjunctive, decentered, and noncumulative 
character of a postcritical practice. Strategy is "the calculation ... of power 
relationships that becomes possible as soon as a subject with will and power..:can 
be isolated. I t  postulates a place ... delimited as its own and serv[ing] as the base 
from which relations to an exteriority can proceed." Tactics, conversely, are 
defined as "calculated action[s] determined by the absence of a proper locus ... The 
space of a tactic is the space of the other ... It  does not have the means to keep to 
itself. ..It. operates in isolated actions, blow by blow. It  takes advantage of 
'opportunities' ... being without any base where it could stockpile its winnin.gs, build 
up its own position.. .What it wins it cannot keep." 
Tactics punch holes in the fabric of ideology. They do not negate, an action 
that always seems to affurm somewhere else, if only by len- itself to narratives 
of progress, purification, or simply change (that is, the value of the new). Since 
negation has been, for capitalist formations, an important maintenance technique - 
- legitimation by opposition, staying in place by moving forward -- materialist 
critique must perhaps find ways to become oblique, interstitial, disorganizing or 
incorporative or proliferative rather than oppositional. [Blasphemy (Haraway) 
and cheekiness (Sloterdijk)] Once attack on the institution of art becomes art, or 
attack on tbe institutions of culture and capitalism becomes those things, critique 
must find different ways to embody its drive toward difference. And then too, 
there is the proverbial bottom line: tactics are what we use when we come up 
against the radical impossibility of a thing that still seems the best thing to do. 
That is a good definition of the state of &airs for materialist critique as I have 
constructed it in this paper. 
Still, tempting as i t  is to block out the field into tactics and strategy, who 
would submit to another decorum, especially one so comfortably binary as that? 
One could, however, imagine collapsing the binary into an irregular oscillation 
between those mutually exclusive practices of resistance. One would have 
strategies interrupted by tactics, purposes interrupted by methods, and vice versa, 
so that which is the law and which the exception, which one dominant which 
transgressive, which* the theory and which the practice, could not be 
programnaatically determined. 
To conceive of critique as practice that makes a problem of its concept is to 
imagine a critical aferlife that is not just the new more inclusive, insidious version 
of the same dull round. Not necessarily the dying into life accomplished by our 
discourses of crises and ends. Not the recuperation of critique by a narrative of its 
failure. I t  is more like Charles Bernstein's imagination of the different life that is 
lived after the narrative has reached conclusion. "They all lived happily ever 
after." End of narrative. The story, however, continues. What Bernstein means is 
that life goes on, happily, providing examples that never quite clinch the claim 
because you never know which is the last unit in the series so you never know 
when the potential for the unhappiness which would disprove that claim has been 
banished. This is critique imagined as more of the same, but because critique was 
always, by definition, a dismantling of "the same," an action carried out in unlike 
terms so that the difference could not be added to the identity, could not make 
"more" of it, continuation proves to be, in this case, a different kind of difference. 
One could think af critique carried out under this anti-rule as examples awaiting 
the law that will reveal them as examples of something. Until that time, they are 
and are not examples, for what exactly is the status of an instance for which one 
cannot frnd the phciple? Perhaps it becomes an example of anything and 
possibly everything. Everything except nothing, that is. That was modernism's 
rule. 
Now: I would like to give some examples. 
1. Impenetrable writing; as in some work by the LANGUAGE poets and critics, 
where the effort is to make language a syntactic or a lexical chaos: a shutout. This 
writing composes an antigrammar minus the organized presentation of that 
anarchy, for that would turn it into antithesis. It wants to avoid generating 
another standard deviation, as in what Bruce Andrews calls the "old chest-busting 
negativism of the avant-garde." The social signature of this work is that of the 
coterie or restricted language game, sigmfying withdrawal from the public sphere. 
At the same time, one could observe (by way of radicalizing that 
LANGUAGE gesture) that the action of publishing these silent forms in places 
that, no matter how marginal, can become part of the loop, deprives that rejection 
of its categorical furity. Is i t  a posture or a policy? Is it a means or an end? Is it 
the postmodern as commercial conservatism or radical resistance? In Fredric 
Jameson's terms, is i t  the Bonaventure Hotel or the Gehry House? 
This is a technicd response to the challenge of writing from the periphery or 
the interstices. How to do it without at the same time projecting an image of 
yourself doing i t  on the screen of interpretation that dissolves difference by 
representing it, letting the medium do the old, crude work of polemic? How to 
construct an apartness within a culture where making is automatically making 
visible and visibility is entry into simulation? The special sort of productivism 
that characterizes our age easily digests the difference that was alienation. 
My opinion is that there is no deep, logically grounded way to contain the 
thriving life of the afterlife of the philosophy of the subject, because depth, 
seriousness, and logical rigor are part and parcel of that discipline. Nor, however, 
should we rush to abandon that discipline with its commitment to rational 
autonomy and logical fulfillment as opposed to utopian t ran~fi~wation.  The 
double gesture of silence and speech, hide and seek -- the impure genre approach -- 
is a technical and superficial response but it also preserves, albeit in an ironic 
. form, the logocentrisn= that it resists. 
2. A related way for a critical practice to confound rather than contest the 
metalogic of our sign economies is by proliferating its presentments, themes, and 
references. By overcrowding the field of meaning, you effectively put all the 
meanings and the very meaning of meaning in question. Interpret anything and 
everything so that the act and its products lose their traditional cultural authority. 
What you want to avoid is the minimalism or blankness that characterized the 
negative way of modernist critique. That is a language game everyone knows how 
to win (and in this case, winning is losing). So, instead of that, overproduction as a 
way of deflating the currency of meaning. The resurgence of interest in Joyce and 
Byron, the prolifics of their ages -- or Blake, "Enough! or too much!" -- is 
something to consider. 
3. A book by Malcolm Ashmore, The Reflexive Thesis: Wrighting Sociology of 
Scientific Knowledge." "Wrighting" in the sense of a)crafting b)inscribing 
c)steadying or correcting, meanings that both mesh and collide. The thesis of the 
title refers both to the fact that the text of the book is indeed, and as signalled 
throughout, the author's doctoral thesis, and also that its thesis in the sense of 
argument is the reflexivity it exemplifies. (A sociohistorical critique would 
usefully observe that a t  one time, the two meanings had an integral, practical 
unity: before, that is, the publication of the dissertation, that thoroughly situated 
and process-oriented exercise, became instrumental in the obtaining of tenure and 
had to be mystified accordingly, reframed as a singular "thought" or thesis: a 
spontaneous and self-justifying contribution to the march of ideas.) This is a book 
constructed in the manner of the Escher drawing that illustrates its cover: circuits 
of self-reflection, so rigorously pursued that the point of reflective departure (the 
subject-position) and the objectness of the topic dissolve. Once these two poles 
vanish, the discreteness of the procedures and performance, and the ratio of means 
to end melt away. The ratio of means to end also evaporates. Ashmore succeeds 
in avoiding the alternative positivity of the deconstructive method (the "counter" 
rationality it engenders) by anchoring the method to its highly particular, even 
unique institutional circumstances. This embeddedness is accomplished by 
arguments that are fashioned as scholarly and casual correspondence, as 
examination questions, as transcripts of lectures and the question-answer 
exchanges that follow. Does the book present (thematize, fictionalize, stylize) 
certain social acts, or is it just doing what comes naturally in certain academic 
circles but doing it onstage, which makes it unnatural. Various deformations of 
the logic of expository presentation (such as, a section entitled "Final Entry" on 
page 85 of a 250 page book, and also on page 85, a section heading, "The Next 
EntryWj help establish an interesting but not really a valorized reflexivity. It is 
not as if they are the practice that illustrates the theory; you cannot tell which is 
wlich and so you don't know what to do with the effects. Your attention as you 
read is increased, but to no obvious end, and thus the extra- or counterdisciplinary 
potential of that increased energy is kept alive. Somewhere, Wittgenstein speaks 
of value never belonging to the set of things that are valued. In Ashmore's book, 
value is put exactly there, inside the set, which means that it is and is not value. 
It withholds the expected dividend of metaconsciousness, of reflexivity as an 
intellectual and ethical value. It enacts a strictly hedonistic narcissism: not 
looking at  yourself so as to realize, improve, extend, or empower yourself (and not 
to abstract the imago for symbolic and exchange purposes) but just looking for the 
pleasure of feeling yourself betwixt and between self and other, the body of 
sensation and the mirror-image: what used to be called "the pleasures of 
imagination. " 
4. Write the problem of representation and resistance as it informed a particular 
historical context and its culturally defining practices: Paul Mann in the moment 
of the avant-garde and the postmodern; T.J. Clark in the moment of 
Impressionism; Henry Louis Gates in the violently juxtaposed moments of 
Edrnund Burke's prosecution of Governor Hastings (a major campaign in Burke's 
war against the ethos of Enlightenment) and Richard Wright's (surprising) brief 
for an Africa enlightened by ~ & o ~ e a n  notions of progressive nationalism. Each of 
these studies develops the historical and logical paradoxes so richly and clearly 
that the local emerges as a thoroughly reflected and legible field. However, the 
reading of that field as such -- a zone delimited by reference to other zones and to 
the system that embraces them -- is held in abeyance. Not dismissed, devalued, or 
declared impracticable: just not done. a result, the particulars do not rise (or 
sink) to illustrate, instance, or even index the general. This is cognitive and even 
causal mapping but with the effect of destabilizing the categories of explanation. 
The authorial perspective is internal and external. [A visual analogy: the famous 
street and house map of Paris; where the graphic detail, indicating features far 
more ephemeral and contingent than the natural formations designated by 
v-  
.3* 
ordinary maps, as well as the iconicity of the actual figures and designs fights 
-. against the indexical and abstract conventions of the conventional modern map. A 
...-.. scalar dissonance.] 
Another version of this thoroughgoing mediational practice: Houston Baker's 
".. 
:L - work on rap, rape, and the nondialectical enfoldedness of urban planning and 
I;r * urban wildness, Wall Street and Harlem, monopolization of the entertainment - 
* - industry and the figure of the black independent music producer. Here the 
aesthetic and the economic, resistance and repression are situational artifacts, 
called forth by the critical act which displays itself as part of that cultural reality. 
5. The land-mine: plant the critique with user-triggered anomalies, similar to 
Stanley Fish's model of affective stylistics where reader response is written into 
the script and manipulated so as to ironize the intentional structures of the work, 
creating parallel or differently coded texts within the same discourse. In the 
surprised-by-sin model, the ironies add up to a heresy. That counter-instruction is 
the safety net: the stable relation between well-defined and internally coherent 
positions. In the example I am imagining, one would have dissonance or 
inconsistency rather than contradiction ot opposition. The integrity of both texts 
would suffer or change. Overall, the effect might resemble the deterritorialized 
writing that Deleuze constructs from the example of Kafka's fiction: an example of 
critique seeming to undergo a process of "becoming minor," perhaps becoming 
fiction, or more probably dissolving the distinction. The effect is of pleasure, the 
pleasure of coming to know, as opposed to the finality of knowledge. 
6. Cultivate artifice and extremity: an obsessional practice. Impose on the study- 
text so steadily that you call up a reaction from it and from the reader. Stretch a 
layer of thought .over the surface and pull it so tight that the minute defects in the 
surface will show through, like the designs children make by chalk-rubbing m y  
mildly uneven surface. 
7. The exercise: a hands-off, nonnarrative informational display. Collect facts, 
beliefs, loosely revolving around an event or problem. Let the material "speak for 
itself': that is, allow the orders which speak through the materials and 
combinations to come through with less static than usual. Or, let the arrangement 
speak with all the puzzling arbitrariness and intimation of pure design. The 
invented archive, reproduced not indexed or narrativized. Catalogue irraisonne. 
8. Assemble symmetrically incompatible facts, beliefs, accounts, and receptions, as 
in Jerry McGann's reading of the contested chapter arrangement in The 
Ambassadors. McGann advances mutually exclusive but equally justified 
narratives of textual production, and with them, incommensurable hermeneutic 
possibilities. 
A related practice: Louis Renza's paratactic method in "A White Heron": 
The Question of Minor Literature. Renza offers the full transcript of the Sarah 
Orne Jev~ett. story and then, specimens of readings, no one of which can speak as a 
truth discourse because all are put forth as "kinds" rather than cases. The method 
engages attention without enthralling it. It imitates, or perhaps replicates, the 
canonical, formal, and rhetorical "minority" of the story it addresses -- its 
thwarting of the Voluptas of literary production. 
9. Critique on the model of self-consuming performance-art: Cornel West, for one: 
performing political theology. 
10. Circulation of documents, characterized by time-lags, crossed messages, 
parallelism, divergence. The model here is definitely not dialogue, which evokes 
the Eden of orality, presence, the consensus of common language users. Instead, a 
writing exchange, where you edit and intervene in one another's work, breaching 
the boundaries of the scriptural and authorial entities but not blurring them into a 
composite text. E-Mail criticism. 
11. Framing: build a context that carries with it fairly determinate hermeneutic 
norms, or that codes certain affective responses. Present the focal text, the one 
that should serve to demonstrate the inscribed principles. Read in that text, read 
around it. Don't, however, do the reading or even coherently intimate it. Show it 
genuinely outflanking the semiotic apparatus. Show yourself not getting all you 
could out of the opportunity and not making a virtue from the restraint. E. Val 
Daniel, "Is There a Counterpoint to Culture; A Study of Sri Lankan ksistzhce." 
12. Lateral critique, as against the verticality of hermeneutics, the tease of 
hidden depths, the privileging of a textual inwardness that tropes the writer's 
interiority and suggests an identical subject-object. This is critique as textual 
commentary in no way subordinate to the self-presence of the work. One might 
use the devices of marginalia, gloss, scholia, parallel texts, facing-page 
translations: the technical inventions of editors turned to cognitive use. Donald 
Ault7s Narrative Unbound. Alexander Kojeve's Hegel. Or, antiquated and highly 
stylized representational formats: Spinoza's geometrical theorems; Talmudic 
commentary, Mishnah. 
To close, I quote again from Michael Taussig: 
Yet I do not think, just as Hegel in his parable of the Master and the 
Slave did not think, that such scrutiny can be undertaken alone. To 
assume it could, would be to fly in the face of. ..the dependence of 
being on the other ... In invoking the presence of images of constructed 
Others, I have not tried to speak for them.. .[n]or have I made it my 
goal to contextualiz[e] and thereby 'explain' them, whatever that 
might mean. What I tried to allow is for their voices to create in the 
context of our hearing contradictory images, dialectical images ...in 
which their attempts to redress the use of themselves as mnemonics 
for the vast project of building other selves.. .bring our own 
expectations and understandings to a momentary standstill. 
I believe that the moment of dialectical images, when they were pregnant 
with redemption, is past. And I believe that Taussig, despite the language of the 
passage above, would say the same. Taussig's phrase, "momentary standstill," is 
meant to invoke Benjamin's Jetztzeit, that shocking and liberating punctum in the 
bland continuum of history. What we have today, and I use Taussig's own 
metaphor, is a screen. On it are projected fantastic images, images of (for 
example) a map of the universe showing the holes where the different eras were 
imperfectly stitched together. These openings are Benjamin's momentary 
standstills, Gadamer's horizon warps, M70rdsworth's spots of time, and the 
innumerable ideas of otherness that haunt our writing. In the movie I am 
invoking, Terry Gilliam's "The Time Bandits," these openings permit whatever is 
human (and therefore dwarfed) to recover the riches created by other human 
agents and to steal those riches back from the master-thieves controlling the 
environment. We can see, however, that the openings open onto the movie screen, 
a solid surface, and behind that, the sui-face of the entertainment industry, and so 
on. 
The regression may be infinite and/or circular but it need not be perfect. I 
remind myself that it is a mistake, an idealism encouraged by the workings of 
ideology, to impute to the orders of things a s e d e s s  operation. A prammatic 
materialism, Kenneth Burke's, cites the virtues of inefficiency, some of which 1 
have explored in this paper. That would appear to be one avenue uiltried by the 
great critiques of reason that have guided the heterological and nondominative 
side of our practice. Not Benjamin's destructive character; not Batailie's radical 
Other to reason and consciousness; not the monstrous and inverted anti-body of 
Bakhtinian carnival; not the negativity of a nontriumphalist and micrological 
dialectics: not the Freudian or the political unconscious. Instead, the inevitable, 
but with respect to time, place, manner, and effects, unimaginable breakdowns in 
the machinery of representation. 
And yet, one wants to do more in the way of a materialist practice than just 
recognize these interruptions of our plans and masteries when they come. 
Further, there seems to me a Merence between soliciting effects and logics that 
interfere with the tendential idealism of every philosophy of the subject, and that 
means every hermeneutic, no matter how radical its materialism, and suffering 
them. I cannot say just what this difference is. It is something to work on. 

